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INSIDE CAMPAIGN FINANCE: MYTHS AND REALmES. By Frank J. 
Sorauf. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1992. Pp. x, 274. $30. 
Reform-oriented commentators have labeled Frank Sorauf's1 con-
tributions to the campaign finance debate "anti-reform writing."2 
This description implies that Sorauf sides either with those satisfied 
with the campaign-finance-system status quo3 or with free-market 
zealots who seek to dismantle the entire campaign finance regulatory 
system.4 In reality, Sorauffalls within neither of these camps. Rather, 
he merely finds the dysfunctions of the present system less serious than 
reformers portray them and, accordingly, favors solutions less radical 
than those that most reformers propose. The reformers' misleading 
characterization of Sorauf may reveal less about his work than it does 
about their own prickliness toward anyone not adhering to their 
Chicken-Little outlook on the political world.5 
· A more intriguing question than how to categorize Sorauf's writ-
ing is why he has chosen to revisit a topic that he covered comprehen-
sively only four years earlier· in Money in American Elections. 6 The 
germ of an answer may lie in his more recent book's full title: Inside 
Campaign Finance: Myths and Realities. As the book progresses, it 
becomes increasingly clear that the "myths" Sorauf refers to are the 
characterizations of the American political system that reformers have 
made and that politicians and the mass media have faithfully parroted; 
the "realities" are those that Sorauf and other political scientists have 
exposed and that the general public has largely ignored. Inside Cam-
paign Finance is not so much about reforming the campaign finance 
system as it is about reforming the reformers. 
After a brief explanation of the history of campaign finance and 
the legal framework established by the Federal Election Campaign 
1. Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota. 
2. See, e.g., Daniel H. Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Refonn: The Root of All Evil ls 
Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 329 (1989). 
3. See, e.g., Frank J. Fahrenkopf, The Campaign Finance System Isn't Sick, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 30, 1987, at A19. 
4. See, e.g., Gerald G. Ashdown, Buying Speech: Campaign Spending, the New Politics, and 
Election Law Refonn, 23 NEW ENG. L. REv. 397 (1988); Sam Kazman, Purer Politics, Greasier 
Pigs, and Other Wonders of Campaign Refonn, REGULATION, Summer 1992, at 62. 
5. Reformers tend to describe the present state of campaign finance in only the most cata-
strophic terms. See, e.g., BROOKS JACKSON, HONEST GRAFT: BIG MONEY AND THE AMERI-
CAN PoLmCAL PROCESS 295 (1988) ("America is becoming a special-interest nation where 
money is displacing votes."); PHILIP M. STERN, THE BEST CoNGRESS MONEY CAN Buy 194-99 
(1988); Lowenstein, supra note 1, at 366 ("Our campaign finance system is corrupt and its-poison 
is a serious blight on American government ..•• "). 
6. FRANK J. SORAUF, MONEY IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS (1988). 
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Act (FECA)7 and the Supreme Court's ruling in Buckley v. Valeo, 8 
Sorauf sets the stage for the conflict between "myth" and "reality." 
Reform positions, he explains, are rooted in a progressive world view 
that both distrusts political money and sees it as the underlying cause 
of most political events (p. 24). According to Sorauf, this view "has 
come to dominate the American debate over campaign finance" (p. 
24), so much so that "the most singular aspect of the debate ... is its 
one-sidedness" (p. 23). The reformers' hegemony, he complains, "has 
created a separate epistemology of campaign finance ... based on its 
own rules of evidence and grounded in the premise of the monetary 
root of all evil. "9 
Central to the ascendance of the reform perspective on campaign 
finance, according to Sorauf, is an unholy alliance between reformers 
and the national news media. The inherent advantage of the progres-
sive view is that it "fits the imperatives of contemporary journalism," 
namely, finding simplistic, morally tinged, and easily recounted stories 
to feed to impatient audiences (p. 24). Reformers' portrayals of the 
campaign finance system as thoroughly corrupted by monetary influ-
ence meet these criteria, however inaccurate those depictions may be. 
On the other hand, "[t]here is little room - and little consumer toler-
ance - for the hedges and caveats, the uncertainties and complexities, 
of the academic accounts" that Sorauf and his colleagues offer (p. 25). 
Consequently, the media communicates the reform message, casually 
describing campaign accounts as "war chests," PACs as "special-in-
terest representatives," and campaign contributions as "sewer money" 
(p. 26). 
Sorauf explains that there are profound differences between polit-
ical scientists' outlook on campaign finance issues and the reform 
mantra. In contrast to academic researchers, who view campaign fi-
nance as a subject of "endless complexity, of ambiguous causes, and of 
shared and dispersed influence," reformers' portrayals are "of domi-
nant actors and great events, of clear and dramatic causes, a mesmer-
izing pageant of power and corruption" (p. 26). The propagation of 
these "Progressive-populist myths" (p. 163), Sorauf says, creates a 
Plato's cave effect, obscuring the complex realities of campaign finance 
7. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as 
amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (1988)). 
8. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In Buckley, the Court held that FECA provisions imposing mandatory 
expenditure limits on congressional campaigns, restricting independent expenditures to $1000 
per year, and limiting the amount of personal wealth that candidates could expend on their own 
campaigns violated the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 424 U.S. at 39-54. As Sorauf 
notes, this ruling left the FECA "a tattered remnant of its original self," and effectively spawned 
a hybrid legislative-judicial campaign finance system. P. 12. Sorauf has elsewhere criticized the 
Court's rationale in Buckley. See Frank J. Sorauf, Caught in a Political Thicket: The Supreme 
Court and Campaign Finance, 3 CONST. COMMENTARY 97 (1986). 
9. P. 23. This view is clearly reflected in Lowenstein, supra note 2, at 301-02. 
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and compelling citizens "to watch the shadows projected on the vast 
wall in front of them ... [in a] dance of distorted images" (p. 189). 
The reform movement attacks our present campaign finance sys-
tem on three basic grounds. First, the reform movement asserts that 
dependence on private "special interest" funding results in pervasive 
corruption of the political system.10 One reform commentator repre-
senting this view claims that "under our present system of campaign 
finance, politicians and interest groups engage routinely ... in feloni-
ous bribery that goes unprosecuted primarily because the crime is so 
pervasive."11 Second, reformers complain that the campaign finance 
system creates powerful proincumbent biases in the electoral process 
that defeat democratic choice.12 Finally, reformers allege that the sys-
tem makes political campaigns too expensive, creating barriers to en-
try for potential candidates and causing fundraising to consume 
inordinate amounts of candidates' and politicians' time. 13 
Sorauf addresses these criticisms of the current system, but does 
not condemn them as baseless or imaginary. Instead Sorauf argues 
that in each case the criticisms are either exaggerated or mistakenly 
regarded as resulting from monetary influences. Sorauf first targets 
the "myth" that campaign contributions effectively purchase legisla-
tive votes. He mocks the presumption that "all transactions in cam-
paign finance are bribes" and forms of "'legalized corruption.' " 14 
Such characterizations are convenient, according to Sorauf, because 
"there are no hard distinctions to make, no need to separate the posi-
tive from the negative, the useful from the destructive" (p. 162). The 
first fallacy in the bribery comparison, he says, is that it portrays a 
unilateral market, with the contributors as aggressive buyers of influ-
ence and candidates as passive, even reluctant sellers (p. 60). In real-
ity, the exchange is bilateral and occurs in a market with a variety of 
prices, terms, and options for both buyer and seller (pp. 63-64). 
Sorauf points out that under a bilateral conception of the political 
marketplace, candidates' behavior and strategies can influence contrib-
utors just as easily as campaign contributors can influence politicians' 
legislative behavior (pp. 64-65). 
Viewing the campaign finance market as bilateral therefore dimin-
ishes the significance of the correlations between campaign contribu-
10. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 5, at 294-95; STERN, supra note 5, at 182-83. 
11. Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intennediate Theory of Politics, 32 
UCLA L. REv. 784, 848 (1985). 
12. See, e.g., STERN, supra note 5, at 35-37; Paul D. Wellstone, True Election Refonn, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 22, 1993, at 18. 
13. See, e.g., LARRY MAKINSON, THE CASH CoNSTITUENTS OF CONGRESS 2 (1992); STERN, 
supra note 5, at 37, 99-100, 197-98; Michael Tackett & Christopher Drew, "The best Congress 
that money can buy," CHI. TRIB., Dec. 7, 1992, § 1, at 1, 8. 
14. Pp. 162-63 (citing Lowenstein, supra note 10, at 848, and AMITAI ETZIONI, CAPITAL 
CoRRUPTION: THE NEW ATTACK ON AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 56-57 (1984)). 
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tions and voting behavior that reformers frequently display as 
evidence of the corruption pervading our political system. ts To 
Sorauf, such correlations are unsurprising: "Contributors contribute 
to like-minded candidates, just as voters vote for like-minded candi-
dates" (p. 165). The real question is which variable is independent and 
which is dependent, or in Sorauf's terms, "[d]oes the money follow the 
votes, or do the votes follow the money?" (p. 165). Sorauf suggests 
that the answer is a little of both, but that the cause-effect ambiguity 
confounds any clear interpretation of reformers' correlative evidence. 
Furthermore, he cites academic studies finding the views of even im-
portant campaign contributors to have little actual influence on legis-
lative voting behavior.16 He postulates that contributors are only 
influential when more important influences such as constituency opin-
ion or party position are not pronounced, and in the sort of policy 
refinements crafted in legislative committees (p. 170). Sorauf con-
cludes: "Contributors do not necessarily seek, or even expect, to score 
impressive policy victories measured by final roll-call votes. . . . [For 
them], the smaller accomplishments have to suffice" (p. 170). 
Sorauf portrays conventional wisdom about the campaign finance 
system's role in securing incumbents' electoral advantages as similarly 
misguided. The reform position, as he describes it, is that 
"[i]ncumbents win so often because they outspend their opponents so 
greatly, and challengers fail to win because they lack the resources 
with which to mount a winning campaign" (p. 175). Sorauf believes 
that this logic suffers from the same cause-effect dilemma as do re-
formers' assumptions about the relationship between campaign finance 
and legislative behavior. The important question, he says, is: "Do 
candidates win because they spend more money, or do they get more 
money, and spend it, because they are likely to win?" (p. 175). 
Sorauf answers that the progressive-populist "money is the root of 
all evil" presumption is even less supportable in the electoral context 
than in the legislative context. He points out that high incumbent re-
election rates predate the campaign finance system installed by FECA 
15. See, e.g., ELIZABETH DREW, PoLmCS AND MONEY 81-87 (1983); STERN, supra note 5, 
at 43-54. 
16. Pp. 166-67 (citing Janet M. Grenzke, PACs and the Congressional Supermarket: The 
Currency Is Complex, 33 AM. J. PoL. SCI. 1 (1989); W.P. Welch, Campaign Contributions and 
Legislative Voting: Milk Money and Dairy Price Supports, 35 W. POL. Q. 478 (1982); and John 
R. Wright, PACs, Contributions, and Roll Calls: An Organizational Perspective, 79 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 400, 411 (1985)); see also JOHN w. KINGDON, CoNGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS 146-
48 (3d ed. 1989) (finding interest-group position to be a weak predictor of voting behavior and 
finding opinions of constituencies and congressional colleagues to be much stronger predictors of 
congressional voting behavior than interest-group position); SORAUF, supra note 6, at 316 
(describing PAC contributions as having "at most a modest influence •.. far less important than 
the voting constituency, the party or the values [of] the legislator"). But see Lowenstein, supra 
note 2, at 313-17 (criticizing the methodology and conclusions of the Grenzke and Wright 
studies). 
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in the l 970s.17 Sorauf suggests that incumbency reelection rates are 
largely propelled by advantages of office that are entirely unrelated to 
campaign finance, such as the postal frank, media access, district of-
fices, and government-paid staffs (p. 175). Sorauf also discusses re-
search showing an inverse relationship between incumbent spending 
and incumbent electoral success. Thus, contrary to conventional wis-
dom, the more incumbents spend, the worse they do.18 
Sorauf does not conclude, as do the reformers, that incumbents' 
reelection rates are so high because they can raise more money. 
Sorauf argues instead that incumbents can raise more money because 
their chances of reelection are so strong. Campaign contributors seek-
ing to curry legislative favor do not count on their money to buy elec-
tions; they simply recognize that because money cannot offset 
incumbents' electoral advantages, supporting challengers is a futile ex-
ercise (pp. 67-70). Hence, "the greatest advantage the incumbents 
have is not their campaign money; it is the expectation early in the 
election cycle that they can and will win reelection" (p. 178). 
Sorauf then turns his attention to the final set of reform criticisms: 
that campaign spending has become excessive and needs to be cur-
tailed. He does not view this complaint as baseless, acknowledging 
several negative practical consequences of the upward spiral in ex-
penditures: consumption of candidates' time, increased prominence of 
money brokers, and heightened b~ers to entry for potential candi-
dates.19 But as a judgment about the value of campaigns, Sorauf feels 
that it reflects "a double standard, one code of behavior for the private 
sector and another for the public sector" (p. 187). He notes that cam-
paign expenditures are dwarf eel by: advertising budgets of large corpo-
rations, comparing the $445.2 million spent on congressional 
campaigns in 1990 to Sears, Roebuck's $1.4 billion advertismg tab for 
the same year (p. 187). Campaigiis, Sorauf insists, are simply expen-
sive; a $600,000 campaign budget for a House race provides funds for 
only two direct mailings and three television advertisements, an effort 
that is "something less than profligate" (pp. 188-89). Given this, 
Sorauf sees "a plausible argument that candidates spend too little, not 
too much, in congressional campaigns."20 
Reformers emphasize public funding of campaigns and enhanced 
restrictions on campaign finance as the exclusive solutions to what 
they see as the deepening quagmire of corruption caused by our cur-
17. Pp. 70, 175. Even statistics cited in reform literature show that Senate reelection rates 
dipped after FECA's passage and House reelection rates are only slightly higher than in the pre-
Watergate era. See MAKlNSON, supra note 13, at 5. 
18. Pp. 176-78 (discussing GARY c. JACOBSON, MONEY IN CoNGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 
(1980)). 
19. Pp. 187-88. 6n this point, at least, Soraufis'in substantial agreement with the reformers. 
See, e.g., STERN, supra note 5, at 37, 99-122; Tackett & Drew, supra note 13, at 8. 
20. P. 189; see also Ashdown, supra note 4, at 417-20. 
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rent system.21 Prominently featured in such proposals are capping 
campaign spending, banning campaign contributions from organized 
interests such as P ACs and from out-of-state or out-of-district contrib-
utors, and providing substantial public subsidies for political cam-
paigns. Essentially, the reformers seek to flush as much private, 
interested money out of the campaign finance system as possible, re-
placing it with a massive transfusion of untainted public funds. 
Unsurprisingly, Sorauf rejects both the need for such major sur-
gery and the efficacy of reformers' solutions. He calls banning PAC 
contributions "probably the worst reform idea of the post-1974 re-
gime" (p. 199). Such a move would not only be unjustified, according 
to the author, but ultimately counterproductive. Sorauf argues that 
banning PAC contributions would increase the leverage of other con-
tributors, disadvantage candidates from the inner city, and obscure the 
sources of contributions, all without significantly stemming the flow of 
interested money.22 He regards spending limits as similarly flawed be-
cause they will increase the electoral system's incumbent bias and be-
cause large contributors can easily evade them (pp. 214-15). Sorauf 
also ridicules reformers' efforts to fund campaigns with public money 
as both politically unviable23 and hopelessly naive (pp. 218-21), com-
paring the assumption that "one can find enough innocent, purpose-
less money'' to "the stork theory of human reproduction" (p. 221). 
Reformers' goals, he declares, constitute "a search to find again a 
golden age of simpler, grass-roots, citizenly politics ... [that] never 
existed except in our nostalgic longings" (p. 221). 
The chasm between these academic "realities" about contributor 
influence and popular perceptions about contributors' roles in the 
political system is attributable to several factors, Sorauf explains. 
First, participants in the campaign finance system, especially the con-
tributors themselves, tend to overplay the importance of financial in-
terests in the legislative process (p. 171). Sorauf cites notorious 
campaign donor Charles Keating as symbolic of this tendency (p. 
171). The misperception also stems from the power of anecdotal evi-
dence to obscure empirical reality. Reformers and the media, Sorauf 
says, focus "on the limited, often dramatic event" that is "chosen to 
show a relationship, not because [it is] representative of the full uni-
verse of PAC-incumbent exchanges" (p. 165). Finally, the public be-
21. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 5, at 301-12; STERN, supra note 5 at 180-84; Wellstone, 
supra note 12, at 18. 
22. Pp. 199-201. A host of generally reform-oriented commentators and groups have re-
cently echoed these concerns. See James A. Barnes, Sticky Wicket, 25 NATL. J. 1108, 1109 
(1993); Sharon Berry, Will Curbing PACs Hurt Black Reps?, BLACK ENTERPRISE, Sept. 1993, at 
25; Larry J. Sabata, Bad Reform Ideas That Sound Good, CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS, Apr.-May 
1993, at 25. 
23. Cf. Barnes, supra note 22, at 1110, 1112 (detailing political and public opposition to 
public funding). 
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lieves inferences of widespread political corruption because our 
political culture's progre8sive-populist values regarding the corrosive 
influence of money render them inherently credible. "The line be-
tween dispositions to believe and foregone conclusions," Sorauf com-
ments, "is very thin" (p. 171 ). 
Sorauf's critique of the contemporary political reform movement is 
convincing to the extent that it exposes reformers' claims about the 
evils of campaign finance as hyperbolic and even somewhat dema-
gogic. He utilizes the voluminous statistics that twenty years of 
mandatory public disclosure of candidates' campaign finance data 
have produced24 in a manner that is forceful, yet not manipulative. 
Perhaps the book's greatest strength is that it strives to paint a com-
plete picture of campaign finance issues and thereby avoids leaving the 
reader thirsting to hear the story's other side. Among a literature 
abundant with one-sided diatribes, rhetorical excesses, and questiona-
ble conclusions, Sorauf's work stands as a thorough and carefully rea-
soned analysis of the effects of the election law reforms instituted in 
Watergate's aftermath. 
Yet Sorauf's statistical analysis cannot completely explain away 
the problems associated with our campaign finance system. Political 
corruption and tainted elections are not worrisome only in the aggre-
gate; they are antithetical to fundamental notions of democracy and 
therefore deeply disturbing whenever they occur. The evidence that 
such phenomena are present at least to some extent in the American 
political system is overwhelming and their existence is confirmed by 
politicians of all stripes.25 To argue, as Sorauf seems to, that such 
incidents should be ignored because they are insufficiently widespread 
is akin to arguing that because the percentage of Americans who are 
murdered each year is tiny, homicide is not a serious social problem. 
Even if Inside Campaign Finance does not prove that the malfunc-
tions of the campaign finance system should go unaddressed, it ex-
poses a significant and alarming rift between the system's reformers 
and the academic experts. Sorauf represents a legion of leading aca-
demics who dissent both from reformers' diagnoses of the maladies of 
our campaign finance system and from their proposed cures.26 It ap-
pears, though, that the reformers, not Sorauf and his cohorts, are the 
ones shaping policy. Both the campaign finance reform bill that the 
24. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-434 (1988). 
25. See STERN, supra note 5, at 99-122; Lowenstein, supra note 2, at 331-34 (discussing state-
ments of Rep. Matsui); Tackett & Drew, supra note 13, at 1 (discussing statement of Rep. Synar). 
26. See, e.g., Gary C. Jacobson, Campaign Finance and Democratic Control: Comments on 
Gottlieb and Lowenstein's Papers, 18 HOFSTRA L. R.Ev. 369 (1989); Herbert E. Alexander, Hid-
den Costs of Campaign Reform, STATE GOVT. NEWS, Apr. 1990, at 16; Curtis Gans, ••. And 
PAC-ing It In: Why Congress Hasn't Broken the Impasse - and How It Can, WASH. POST, Dec. 
6, 1992, at CS; Sabato, supra note 22. 
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Senate passed in 1993 27 and the House's 1993 bil1 28 revolve around 
spending limits, public funding, and a drastic reduction in the role of 
private contributors - all remedies that Sorauf and other academic 
experts regard as unnecessary and counterproductive. This disjunc-
tion between expert opinion and legislative product suggests that the 
current round of campaign finance reforms will be no more successful 
at rooting out corruption and electoral bias than its predecessor of the 
Watergate era. Thus the rift between political scientists and the re-
form movement presents potentially serious repercussions. 
Unfortunately, Inside Campaign Finance is unlikely to make 
Sorauf's message more audible above the din of reform rhetoric. 
Deiise with statistics and primarily discursive in tone, its message bur-
ied in back pages, the book is truly an academic work. Certainly, 
there is nothing wrong with academic writing per se, but when an is-
sue is on the political front burners, as campaign finance presently is, 
and one's opponents are as articulate and media-savvy as campaign 
finance reformers have proved themselves to be,29 an academic tome is 
undoubtedly an inopportune forum. It is regrettable that a specious 
newspaper editorial can have more impact than a thoroughly 
researched and analytically cogent book like Inside Campaign Fi-
nance. However, it is difficult to see how academics can engineer the 
triumph of their "realities" over the reform movement's "myths" and 
thereby influence the next wave of campaign finance reforms while re-
maining ensconced in their ivory towers. 
- Michael R. Phillips 
27. S. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 
28. H.R. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The House bill differs from the Senate's plan in 
several material respects, and the bills had not been reconciled before adjournment of the first 
session. 
29. One important reason for the reform movement's ability to communicate its message 
effectively through the media is that many leading reformers are members of the media them· 
selves. Prominent examples include Elizabeth Drew, who writes for the New Yorker, and Brooks 
Jackson, a member of the Wall Street Journal staff. 
